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Since the state’s second constitution was adopted in 1972, Montana’s
supreme court justices have been selected through a hybrid process that uses
both a merit appointment system and an elective system. Though essentially
an elective system, the appointment process is used when mid-term vacancies
occur—when justices leave office during their terms. Between 1973 and 1994
six vacancies on the state’s high court were filled by appointment and nine by
election.
Montana’s hybrid system offers the material by which the theory of judicial
selection, a theory which begins in the Revolution era of United States history,
can be examined against its results. The judiciary presents a peculiar problem
for democratic societies. It needs to be sufficiently independent from popular
will to allow it to make impartial decisions that may displease the public, but
are necessary to protect individual rights or to uphold the fairness of the law.
At the same time, it must be responsive enough to the public to be consistent
with basic democratic principles. To the extent that justices of the Montana
Supreme Court make law, the “people” have a right to elect—or
unseat—them.
The theory of judicial selection received a practical workout at the Montana
Constitutional Convention of 1972. Delegates to that convention drew up the
judicial article of the Montana constitution after debating the same theories
that the national framers in 1787 worked through. They came to more
populist conclusions than the national framers had. The appointment and
election processes they designed have home out many of their fears. Recent
elections and appointments are examined. Some of the people involved speak
about the process. Nonpartisan elections are recommended to fill all
Montana’s high court seats.
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CHAPTER I
EARLY HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION: COMPETING VALUES
A.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Judicial independence is a confusing concept. Some of the confusion

arises out of the pecuhar metamorphosis of the judiciary during the
contentious decade of the 1780s. The final product of this conflict—an
unelected national judiciary empowered with judicial review—leaves the
impression that judicial independence has always been characterized in
American government by a high degree of freedom from popular influence,
freedom that flows from an assumption that the “professionalism” of the
decision-making role of judges—the technical work of reviewing laws—should
remove judges from popular selection. In fact, this profile took shape only after
heated debate among the citizens of the early Republic who took seriously the
loss of democratic accountability represented in the formation of an unelected
judiciary empowered to negate some actions of their democratically elected
legislatures. Examination of judicial independence is inextricably tied to an
analysis of the judiciary's power, for the American judiciary armed with judicial
review became a whole new political force, and independent in a way not all
Americans had envisioned it. An examination of the diverse meanings of
judicial independence in the American judiciary’s formative years brings new
Ufe to the debate over judicial selection for Montana’s high court.
Gordon S. Wood, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Radicalism o f the
American Revolution, calls the creation of the independent judiciary “the most
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dramatic institutional transformation in the early Republic.”! The conflict
that preceded the creation of this powerful judiciary reveals varied opinion
behind the definition of judicial independence. During this period, the
Federalists, led by James Madison, wrested the protection of “private property
and minority rights” away from “the interests of the enhanced public power of
the new republican govemments”2 in part through the creation of the national
judiciary. Wood writes:
These efforts to carve out an exclusive sphere of activity for the
judiciary, a sphere where the adjudicating of private rights was removed
from politics and legislative power, contributed to the remarkable
process by which the judiciary in America suddenly emerged out of its
colonial insignificance to become by 1800 the principal means by which
popular legislatures were controlled and limited.3
The transformation from “colonial insignificance” to the “principal means by
which popular legislatures were controlled and limited” is in large measure the
story of arriving at tiie modem meaning of “judicial independence.”
The first American constitutions, those drawn up by states between
1776 and 1780, show a marked confusion over judicial independence. This
confusion arises in part because while in theory it was easy to declare the
judicial branch independent, in fact it was difficult to create an independently
powerful judidaiy without endowing it with some form of policy-making power.
Eventually, of course, this power would be the power of judicial review.

1 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New
York: Random House, 1991), 322.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 323.
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Nearly all the state constitutions framed prior to the national
Constitution of 1787 contained specific language declaring an interest in
separating the branches of government. These declarations no doubt owe their
existence to their framers’ dedication to the political theory of Montesquieu,
whose major contribution to the separation of powers “doctrine” was the
addition of an in d p e n d en t judiciary.** But the state framers had a problem
applying Montesquieu’s theory because it was based on a “mixed government”
model predicated on a society with well-defined class barriers. Montesquieu’s
interest in separation of powers was to divide power among different
classes—monarchy, aristocracy and dem ocracy.^ The English and French
judiciaries did not provide good models for separation of powers in the early
republics of the American states. The framers’ confusion over how to apply
the concept of separation of powers to their judiciaries is evident in the fact
that the provisions regarding judicial functions are found interspersed
throughout their constitutions in articles describing both the executive and the
legislative branches.
The earlier constitutions—those of Pennsylvania and New York, for
example—contain provisions for the judiciary which do not clearly separate
that branch from the legislative or executive. Both the duties and the
personnel of the judicial branches in these constititions are sometimes shared

4 Edward J.Erler, “The Constitution and the Separation of Powers,” The
Framing and Ratification o f the Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy and Dennis
J. Mahoney (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 153.
5 Ibid., 154.
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with the executive and legislative branches. In New York the body charged
with the power most closely resembling "judicial review” was composed of the
governor, chancellor and supreme court judges and could send legislation back
to the general assembly on grounds that the legislation was incompatible with
constitutional provisions, subject to a two-thirds-majority legislative override.6
Pennsylvania, an anomaly among state constitutions because of its strongly
democratic flavor, created a "Council of Censors,” a large elected body with the
power to review all laws passed by the legislature and to throw out any that did
not conform to the principles of the state’s constititution. Though its power
most closely approximates what today is called “judicial review,” the
Pennsylvania Council of Censors was not its Supreme Court, and looked much
more like an arm of the legislative branch.?
Other clues show that Revolution-era Americans were divided over the
meaning of judicial "independence.” Evidence from the first state constitutions
points to the possibility that some factions in Revolution-era society wanted
judicial independence for reasons other than to protect elite minorities and their
property rights from the power of the majority’s will.
Most of the new state constitutions provided for life terms for state high
court justices, limited only by the justices’ good behavior. Although this might
seem to indicate an interest in removing the judiciary from the influence of the
people, in fact, it may have been a step toward greater popular control. Willi
6 Francis Newton Thorpe, A Constitutional History o f the American
People, 1776-1850 (New York, 1898), vol. 5, 2628.
7 Thorpe, vol. 6, 3091.
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Paul Adams suggests in The First American Constitutions that framers of early
state constitutions were loath to use the British example that allowed terms to
be limited “by the pleasure of the Crown.” Only South Carolina, Adams points
out, retained the “during pleasure” (of the governor) language,® Viewed in this
light, allowing judges to sit until they died or misbehaved enough to warrant
impeachment showed some desire to hold judges accountable to the people,
rather than to allow one person—a governor, or as in the past “the Crown”—to
determine a judge’s fitness for office. Such provisions were less democratic
than terms limited to a specified number of years, but term limitations of this
nature were rare in early state constitutional provisions for the highest courts.
(Pennsylvania, of course, provides the exception.)
Provisions for judicial salaries represent another aspect of state
constitutions that may be misread when searching for the meaning of judicial
independence. Certainly a salaried judidaiy was a more independent judidary,
but independent of what? Marvin L. Michael Kay argues in “The North
Carolina Regulation, 1766-1776: A Class Conflict” that the back country
farmers who opposed the Whig elites in North Carolina during the 1776
framing of its constitution favored a paid judidary, and that the provision
establishing remuneration of supreme court justices by salary instead of by

®Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican
Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 301.
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fees was a Whig concession to the agrarian majority.9 In some places, North
Carolina among them, the “user fee” court system had helped to support the
interests of a wealthy elite against the small land and tax claims of poorer
settlers. 10 In North Carolina, at least, the salaried judiciary was meant to
keep its courts independent of control by moneyed interests.
B.

THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787

The judicial article in the national Constitution of 1787 would seem to
represent the victory of the elitist vision of framers like James Madison over
the more democratically inclined vision held by some of the earlier state
framers. It is not that simple, though. Although the framers endowed the
United States Supreme Court with independence from popular participation in
the selection of Supreme Court justices, the power of the Court evolved over
time. The framers did not give the Court the power of judicial review outright.
They may have intended the Court to exercise judicial review, but they did not
explicitly write that power into the Constitution. The power of judicial review is
the key element establishing judicial independence from the other two
branches of government. With the Constitution of 1787 the examination of
judicial independence clearly requires two separate discussions, one about
structural independence from the voters and the other about separation of
powers among the three branches of government. Independence from popular
9 Marvin L. Michael Kay, “The North Carolina R e la t io n , 1766-1776:
A Class Conflict.” In The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of
American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1976), 107.
^oibid., 76.
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will was built into the Constitution through provisions for life terms for judges
and selection by the president with confirmation by the Senate (the more elite
of the two houses in the legislative branch). But independence from the
legislative and executive branches was produced by the Court itself when it
assumed the power of judicial review.
In fact, views on the principle of judicial independence vary depending on
the observer’s understanding of the role of the Court. James Madison, the
person whose vision of an independent judiciary probably most influenced the
national model, provides a good example of the confusion that sets in when
these two distinct types of independence — independence from the people
versus independence from the other branches — converge in the national
judiciary. Madison insisted that “an effective Judiciary establishment
commensurate to the legislative authority was essential. A Government
without proper Executive and Judiciary would be a mere trunk of a body
without arms or legs to act or move.”ii Apparently Madison strongly favored a
judiciary independent from the legislative and executive branches. Yet
Madison was leary of allowing the unelected Supreme Court to practice judicial
review. Madison’s recommendation in the Virginia Plan was to give a “council
of revision” composed of “the Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary” the authority to examine “every act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate, and every act of a particular Legislature

11 Ralph A. Rossum, “The Courts and the Judicial Power,” The Framing
and Ratification o f the Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy and Dennis J.
Mahoney (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1987), 225.
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before a Negative thereon shall be final,” subject to a legislative

o v e r r i d e . 12

The proposal for the council of revision was defeated at the Philadelphia
Convention. During the subsequent debate over extending the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to “all cases arising under this Constitution” and the laws
passed by Congress, Madison “denied that the Supreme Court had a general
power to interpret the C o n s t i t u t i o n . ” !^ In 1788 Madison reiterated his belief
that the judiciary did not possess the general power of expounding the
Constitution because that would elevate the judicial branch over the legislative
b r a n c h . 14 I t

was to this limited judiciary that Madison extended independence

from voter control.
The clearest example of the link between judicial independence from the
people and the nature of judicial power comes from the Antifederalist essayist
Brutus. Brutus would seem to agree that the unique character of the judiciary
necessitated distancing it from popular selection. “[I]t would be improper,”
Brutus wrote, “that the judicial should be elective, because their business
requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge, which is acquired
only by a regular education, and besides it is fit that they should be placed, in a
certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness

i2/6td., 223.
13/bid., 235.
14 Ibid., 236.
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and steadiness in their decisions.”i5 But Brutus, who wrote in his No. XI essay
that allowing the Court to judge all matters “in law and equity" would in effect
give the Court power “to explain the constitution according to the reasoning
spirit of it, without being confined to words or l e t t e r , ” 16 recommended a
democratically selected superbody empowered to get rid of justices who
displeased the popular majority. “This supreme controlling power [over the
judiciary] should be in the choice of the people, or else you establish an
authority independent, and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to the
principles of a free government."!? Brutus envisioned a Court independent
enough to interpret the Constitution; he was therefore not willing to give it as
much indpendence from the people as Madison allowed it.
Brutus’ willingness to accept an unelected judiciary was not necessarily
a typical sample of popular reaction to the new Constitution’s provisions for
judicial selection. The framers’ desire to establish a professional judiciary very
much independent of the people met with firm opposition. Wood claims
“populist radicals” of the period went down swinging against the movement
toward law as “a science removed from politics and comprehended by only an

15 Brutus, “Essays of Brutus," chap. in The Anti-Federalist: Writings by
the Opponents of the Constitution, ed. Herbert J. Storing (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1981), No. XVI, 188.
i6 /6 id . No. XI, 164.
17 Ibid., No. XVI, 188.
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10
enlightened few who needed to be educated in special professional law
schools.”i8
This opposition was overcome by persistent efforts of the government
itself. Wood claims, ‘The desire for an independent expert judiciary was bred
by the continuing and ever renewed fears of democratic politics.”i9 By 1831,
when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America, the judiciary was
sufficiently powerful and independent to suggest to Tocqueville that the courts
“are the visible organs by which the legal profession is enabled to control the
d e m o c r a c y . ”20

The pre-1787 vision of the courts as a democratic institution, in

which the “power of judging was to be exercised by juries drawn periodically
from the people”; and in which “in the exercise of the jury function the people
were themselves to be judges”2i was in temporary abeyance. Under the new
national Constitution, “the establishment of an independent judicial power
[meant] transforming [the] jury system into a judiciary and juries into
j u d g e s . ”22

This “professionalism” of the law established another aspect of

judicial independence, the one most responsible for the belief that the judiciary
cannot be popularly selected. The idea of a highly trained, expert judiciary

18 Wood, 323.
i9 /6 id .

20 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (Part 1, 278), as quoted in
Wood, 325.
21 Erler, 153.
22/6id!., 154.
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evolved from the provisions in Article III of the 1787 Constitution and from
political pressures of the early Republic.
0 . JUDGES AS POLICY-MAKERS
Whether the framers intended it for them or not, justices assumed an
important policy role as soon as they asserted the power of judicial review.
Brutus’ fear that Supreme Court justices would be able to “explain the
constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it” became reality, though it
may have stopped short of his prediction that they would not be “confined to
[its] words or letter.” A justice’s power to negate legislation deemed
“unconstitutional” may be limited by strict constructionism or expanded by
broad interpretation. All justices believe they are confined by the words and
letter of the constitution, but each views that limitation differently. Within the
spectrum of varying judicial attitudes toward their freedom to interpret the
words of the Constitution fies the territory of “judicial discretion.” The variety
of acceptable definitions of judicial discretion is apparent in the views of two
distinguished twentieth centuiy Supreme Court justices, Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Felix Frgmkfurter.
Holmes, reacting against the common belief of his time that judges could
operate as disembodied automatons, weighing the pros and cons of any legal
problem dispassionately and without personal reaction, described the role of
the judge this way:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience....
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
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a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which good men should be g o v e r n e d . 23
Holmes’ description sounds like modem judicial realism. Because the courts
have the power to affect policy, they will affect policy. Because the courts’
personnel is human, experience will color justices’ logic.
Like Holmes, Frankfurter sees a subjective element in the work of a
judge: the Court’s task, according to Frankfurter, “is to seize the permanent,
more or less, from the feelings and fluctuations of the

t r a n s i e n t . ”2 4

But in the

same speech before the Pennsylvania Law School, Frankfurter went on to
express hostility to the idea that a Supreme Court justice is “left at large to
exercise his private w i s d o m

. ”2 5

Somewhere between Holmes’ realistic

edlowemce that judicial decision-making is more experience than logic and
Frankfurter’s admonition that no judge is free simply to decide cases as he
pleases hes a very fine line, a very subjective line—the line which separates
permissible judicial policy-making from the impermissible.
Some argue that the independence of the judiciary from popular election
creates—and also in some measure should limit—the policy-making discretion
of the judiciary. Judge Richard Posner, a Reagan appointee to the federal
bench, writing in 1984 in favor of limits to judicial activism, lays the blame for
federal judicial activism squarely at the door of the political branches: “the

23/6id., 2.

24 Felix Frankfurter, “The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices,” 105
University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 781, 793 (1957).
25 Frankfurter, 794.
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political branches are happy to shift responsibility for unpopular policies to the
federal courts, which are a kind of lightning rod since the judges cannot be voted
out of o f f i c e . ”2 6 Posner calls the modem legislative process

“i m d i s c i p l i n e d ” 27

and charges that legislative waffling on the issues which divide society creates
a vacuum which justices have no choice but to fill with decisions that amount
to judicial lawmaking. When the legislative branch does act, it does so in such
a way as to force the courts further into setting policy. “Some statutes indeed,
are so general that they merely provide an initial impetus to the creation of
bodies of frankly judge-made law,” according to P o s n e r . 2 8 Posner finds this
especially disturbing in areas “on which there is no ethical

c o n s e n s u s ”2 9

(abortion, for example).
Posner faults constitutional interpretation as having fallen into similar
patterns of judicial pohcy-making. Partly the inevitable result of moving away
in time from the date of constitutional enactment, but “especially since many
such provisions seem deliberately couched in vague and general terms,”
justices’ interpretation of the Constitution is more and more simply justices
setting public policy, Posner c l a i m s .30

26 Richard A. Posner, “The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint” 59
Indiana Law Journal 1, 13 (1984).
27 Posner, 6.
28 Posner, 5.
29 Posner, 17.
30J6id., 6.
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Montana’s Supreme Court has certainly been affected by judicial policy
making of this nature. One justice demonstrated the court’s willingness to
accept a policy-making role, writing in an opinion, “Where the Legislature fails
to take cognizance of important legal obligations and fails to provide the
appropriate remedies, this Court will not hesitate to act.”3i Such willingness
to enter the legislative arena has placed the Montana Supreme Court in a
number of controversial positions, probably the most noticeable of which was
its central role in rewriting school funding legislation. The court’s critics have
charged it with the “creation out of whole cloth of a ‘fundamental right’ [to
access to the courts] limiting the

l e g i s l a t u r e ”32

and of “rather cavalierly

[disregarding] a recent constituent assembly and the authorized and good faith
decisions of the legislative representatives.’’^^
Posner suggests that, while the judicial independence written into the
constitutional makeup of the judiciary invites judicial activism, that very
structural independence should tell judges to limit their policy-making. He
argues: “What can fairly be inferred from the constitutional scheme is that
the judges are not to exercise the same freewheeling legislative discretion as

31 Frank Morrison, Fode v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 719 Pacific
Reporter 2d 414, 416.
32 Supplemental Reply Brief of Montana Liability Coalition, Real Party
in Interest at 43, State ex rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizen
Rights V. Waltermire, Docket No. 86-400, as quoted in James J. Lopach, “The
Montana Supreme Court in Politics” 48 Montana Law Review 267, 282.
33 James J. Lopach, “The Montana Supreme Court in Politics,” 48
Montana Law Review 267, 296.
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the elected representatives.. ..”34 in other words, the framers could accept a
limited policy-making role for unelected justices, but would balk at the policy
making latitude allowed to unelected federal judges today.
D. JUDICIAL CHARACTER
Since justices are endowed with a policy-making power limited to a large
extent only by their own discretion, the character of judges becomes a central
issue. Like all the essential factors governing an effective judiciary, the debate
over judicial character—and over the best way to staff a court with persons
possessed of the necessary personal virtues—is as old as the first efforts of
states to create the third branch of government. The core elements of the
debate have changed little, even though at the state level methods of selection
have fluctuated between elitist appointment provisions to wide-open
democratic election and back again.
The essential qualities of good judges inspire endless commentary.
Michael Polelle, a professor at John Marshall Law School writing in favor of
reform to the selection of federal judges, suggests that Americans would do well
to read William Penn’s thoughts on the law from Penn’s 1682 tract The Frame
o f Government o f Pennsylvania:
I know some say, let us have good laws, and no matter for the
men who execute them: but let them consider, that though good
laws do well, good men do better: for good laws may want good
men, and be abolished or evaded by ill men; but good men will
never want good laws, nor suffer ill o n e s . 3 5
34 Posner, 16.
35 Michael J. Polelle, “Selection of Federal Judges: Time for Reform?” 54
Montana Law Review 1,57-8 (1993).
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Benjamin Cardozo echoes Penn in his enjoinder that “[tjhere is no guaranty of
justice.. .except the personality of the j u d g e . ”36
The consensus of informed opinion on the qualities that make a good
judge can be summed up in a paraphrase of Justice Potter Stewart’s
exasperated statement about the difficulty of defining obscenity: no one is able
to define precisely these qualities, but everyone knows them when they see
them. Frankfurter called for both intellectual and moral qualities in
“technically equipped lawyers” who are “widely read and deeply cultivated.”
Among the judge’s moral qualities should be “a disposition to be detached and
withdrawn.’’^? “Greatness in the law,” Frankfurter summarized in his speech
to the Pennsylvania Law School, citing examples of justices who fit each
definition,
is not a standardized quality, nor are the elements that combine to
attain it. [It may be] the power of penetrating analysis exerted by a
trenchant mind [Bradley];.. persistence in a point of view forcefully
expressed over a long judicial stretch [Field]; .. coherent judicial
philosophy, expressed with pungency and brilliance
[Holmes];.. resourceful deployment of vast experience and an originating
mind [Brandeis];.. the influence of a singularly endearing personality in
the service of sweet reason [Cardozo];.. [or] the kind of vigor that exerts
moral authority over others [ H u g h e s ] .3 8
Posner offers a vision of the “bedrock elements of judicial workmanship” which
mirrors Frankfurter’s:

36 Benjarcdn Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 16-17.
37 Frankfurter, 793-795.
38 Ibid., 784.
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Self-discipline (implying among other things due submission to the
authority of statutes, precedents, and other sources of law),
knowledge of law and thoroughness of legal research, a lucid
writing style, a power of logical analysis, common sense,
experience of life, a commitment to reason and relatedly to the
avoidance o f‘result-oriented’ decisions in the narrow sense in
which I should like to see the term used, openness to colleagues’
views, intelligence, hard work—.. all are indeed the bedrock
elements of judicial w o rk m a n sh ip .3 9
These definitions contain common elements—good judges are disciplined,
smart and well-trained legally; they also have common sense and wisdom. The
connection of these characteristic to the process of selecting judges becomes
problematic because none of these qualities is readily apparent to an
electorate, at least to an electorate informed the way the modem electorate is,
through political campaigns which rely heavily on cosmetic information.
Nevertheless, in almost half of the states, supreme court justices are
popularly elected, at least in theory.
E.

JUDICIAL SELECTION OF STATE HIGH COURTS

Given the difficulty balancing the competing values involved, it is not
surprising that there are almost 50 different methods used for selecting judges
in the 50 states. “There is an almost endless combination of mechanisms used
to select state judges,” wrote Lyle Warrick in the overview chapter of the
American Judicature Society’s 1993 compendium of provisions for selecting
state ju d g e s.4 0 Generalizations can be made, however, especially if one
narrows the focus to judicial selection procedures for state high courts.
39 Posner, 22.
40 Lyle Warrick, Judicial Selection in The United States: A Compendium
o f Provisions (Chicago: The American Judicature Society, 1993), 5.
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Warrick’s research reveals that states are equally divided today between those
which hold elections for initial selection of supreme court justices and those
which use nominating commissions to advise governors in supreme court
justice appointments. Of the 22 states which elect their supreme courts
initially, 10 hold partisan elections and 12 hold nonpartisan elections. While 22
states fill high court vacancies with the commission/governor plan, Warrick
documents 32 states using commission plans to aid the governor in selecting
some or all of their judicial officers, with 10 of these having adopted or extended
a previous commission plan during the 1980s.4i The AJS’ compendium had to
be updated from its original 1980 publication in large measure simply because
so many states had changed from elective to appointive systems. With so
many states opting to jetison elected judiciaries, Montana’s system, which
provides for initial election of all judicial officers and gubernatorial appointment
of interim vacancies, deserves re-examination.
Proponents of an appointment process say it is a more efficient means
of finding the most highly qualified persons. Their opponents argue that the
political elements of this process—nomination and confirmation by “insiders”
to the government’s power circles—produce judges who fit the political
necessities of the well-placed, but who are not necessarily cast in the mold
recommended by Frankfurter or Posner. In other words, if a Republican
president is replacing a black Supreme Court justice, the president may want
to scan the horizon to find a black Republican—any black Republican with the
minimum qualifications for a Supreme Court appointment. That black
41 Ibid., 5-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
Republican may become a Supreme Court justice, not because the candidate
is the most qualified—having, in fact, received the lowest ABA rating ever
among persons considered for such appointments—but because this candidate
fits the pohtical necessities, in this case being both black and a member of the
Republican Party.
Debate over what constitutes a healthy measure of popular control over
judicial selection has changed little in principle from the time of the Revolution.
On its surface the evidence of judicial selection as it is practiced both on the
federal and state level would appear to support Alexander Hamilton’s
argument that allowing “the people” more control over the process of judicial
selection is foolhardy. Hamilton argued that even allowing the House of
Representatives a hand injudicial selection was going too far. The House, he
argued, would be too slow, too “interested,” too divided among themselves in
pohtical favors and debts, to produce an effective judiciary. Hamilton, of
course, favored a judiciary chosen by one person thereby increasing
accountability for the appointments and reducing (he believed) the chance of
appointment of political hacks and

c r o n i e s .42

In fact, the reason so many

states wanted to reform their elected judiciaries in the early 1900s was that

42 Gary Wills, ed. The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison and John Jay (New York; Bantam Books, 1982), Hamilton, Federalist
No. 76, 384-385.
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machine politics had overtaken state judicial selection by the late 1800s,43
exactly the fear Hamilton expressed in The Federalist,
All judicial selection processes involve a critical compromise. To get
some of Hamilton’s elitist expertise in finding the most qualified judges, voters
may he willing to give up some of the ideal of popular sovereignty. On the other
hand, Montanans—at least in theory—currently trust the people with all the
power of selection. Each variable in the selection process requires
examination, not of its purpose, but of its results, for the purposes of judicial
selection methods may not produce the intended r e s u l t s . 4 4

43 Madison B. McClellan, “Merit Appointment versus Popular Election:
A Reformer’s Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida,” 43 Florida Law
Review 535 (1991).
44 McClellan, 541.
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CHAPTER TWO
MONTANA GRAPPLES WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION
AS IT REWRITES ITS CONSTITUTION IN 1972
INTRODUCTION
Recent arguments about judicial selection are strikingly similar to old
ones. When Montanans wrote a new constitution in 1972, the debate over
judicial selection produced arguments and solutions that were mere
restatements of founders’ philosophies. The main dispute separating delegates
was whether to adopt a “merit” selection system. Under merit selection,
judges are chosen by a citizen committee that screens candidates to recruit
the best qualified persons. Though the idea gained momentum in the twentieth
century at the state level, its thrust is in line with Brutus’ 1780 suggestion
that federal judges be nominated through just such a “superbody.” Arguments
against merit selection always hinge on the policy-making power vested in the
judiciary, as they did when Madison and Hamilton wrestled with the issue.
That some would suggest that participation in judicial selection should be
confined to a angle participant—the governor—would not surprise Hamilton
devotees. That others would suggest that judges endowed with a policy-making
role should be selected in a process that assures accountability to voters would
not surprise students of Madison. Montana’s solution in 1972 was to retain
the elected judiciary while revamping the system which produced interim
appointments.
Dissatisfaction with Montana’s elective system of selecting judges
brewed throughout the 1960s. Rumblings of discontent about the state’s

21
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judicial system in general were one of the major motivators behind the call for
wholesale constitutional revision, a movement which accelerated through the
late 1960s and culminated in the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Though the
state’s system of electing its judiciary changed little as a result of the new
constitution, the heated debate over the constitution’s judicial provisions
reveals themes that run through all Montana’s politics and that connect
Montana’s debate over judicial selection to those experienced nationwide since
1776. Defining judicial independence and striking an acceptable balance
between that independence and accountability to the people remain the central
issues. Underlying each issue is the problem presented by “influence,” or the
fear that the judiciary could be compromised if its selection allowed specific
interests to gain control of the selection process.
In Montana’s politics of 1972, the “influence” most suspected—and
feared—was that of the state’s three great corporations, the Anaconda
Company, Burlington Northern Railroad and Montana Power Company. Pear
of this influence was a driving force in the general debate over the merits of
electing judges versus appointing them. The convention flip-flopped twice over
what was then a novel idea—publicly financed judicial elections, a
recommendation bom entirely out of a desire to avoid an unhealthy wielding of
influence on the courts. The jagged course that this proposal took through the
convention shows again and again the importance delegates attached to
“influence.”
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A.

MONTANA'S MOVEMENT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM, 1966-1972
The movement for judicial reform took its first official step when 104

citizens met to examine weaknesses in the state’s judicial system at a
September 29,1966, conference in Great Falls. The citizens determined,
among other things, that “[p]resent nonpartisan elections have not succeeded
in removing Montana judges from political pressures and uncertainties.’’45 The
citizens’ report recommended that judges be nominated by a screening board
and appointed by the governor to be approved or disapproved at intervals by
the voters. The delegation further recommended that a committee begin to
study revamping Montana’s judicial system, especially its selection process.
This committee studied the judicial system for five years before submitting the
so-called “Montana Plan” to the Constitutional Convention. In the interim,
David R. Mason and William F. Crowley, both University of Montana Law
School professors, published their 1967 Montana Law Review article,
“Montana’s Judicial System—A Blueprint for Modernization,” which formed
the substance of the eventual Montana Plan.
In their article Mason and Crowley concentrated on selling a more
centrally controlled and—they hoped—more efficient judiciary, a “system” with
the supreme court as the administrative authority over the lower courts. The
lower courts would be reorganized to reflect Montana’s new urban population
majority. The article did not emphasize judicial selection, but the professors did
recommend that the state’s constitution should be amended to “[p]ermit the

45 “Judicial System Reforms Sought,” The Billings Gazette, October 2,
1966, 25.
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legislature to provide methods of selection other than election for members of
the judiciary.”46
In October 1971, with the election of delegates to the constitutional
convention in sight, the University of Montana Law School unveiled its
Montana Plan, the product of five years’ development. The elements of judicial
selection under the Montana Plan were refinements of the Missouri Plan, the
prototype for “merit” selection proposals.4?
Under the Montana Plan both supreme court justices and district court
judges would be chosen by the governor from lists of two to four neimes
submitted by a nominating committee composed of lawyers and members of
the general public. Once on the bench, judges would run “against their records”
periodically—that is, unopposed by alternative candidates. Should voters elect
to retire a judge under this system, the screening committee would nominate
new judicial candidates and the governor would appoint one from among these
nominees. Further, a “research and qualifications” committee of lawyers,
judges and members of the public would have authority to investigate improper
judicial conduct and to recommend that a judge be retired, censured or removed

46 David R. Mason and William F. Crowley, “Montana’s Judicial
System —A Blueprint for Modernization,” 29 Montana Law Review 1 (1967), 8.
47 The movement for merit selection of judges began in the early 1900s
and was implemented full scale for the first time in Missouri in 1940. Merit
selection was a reaction against state judicial election campaigns, especially
those of the late nineteenth century, which were dominated by party machine
politics. Sandra Muckelston, “The Judiciary,” Constitutional Convention Study
No. 14, 136.
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from the bench.48 The law school's committee presented this plan as an
alternative to the 1889 Constitution’s elective provisions.
B. DEBATE OVER THE JUDICIARY AT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1.

General Sparring

The convention’s judiciary committee split 5-4 regarding the Montana
Plan, with the minority supporting it.49 The committee’s split was indicative of
the whole convention’s sharp division over the judiciary. Debate over the plan
on the floor of the convention reveals that elective-versus-appointive judiciary
was the stickiest issue about the judicial article, although the whole article was
controversial.
The division of opinion boiled down to a decision whether to support a
“modernized,” but admittedly experimental, court system along the lines of the
Montana Plan, or to adhere to the old system with its populist features, the
most obvious of which was the election of judges. Because the initial floor
debate on February 26 was dominated by lawyers and confusing to many
delegates, the convention became mired in uncertainty. The division among

48 Daniel J. Foley, “Court revamp unveiled,” Billings Gazette, October
16, 1971, 1.
49 Judiciary committee chairman David Holland (Butte) and delegates
Cedor Aronow (Shelby), Leslie Eskildsen (Malta), Rod Hanson Fairfield) and
John Schiltz (Billings) voted as the majority against the Montana Plan.
Committee vice-chariman Catherine Pemberton (Broadus), Jean Bowman
(Billings), Ben Berg (Bozeman) and Mason Melvin (Bozeman) voted in favor of
the Montana Plan. Jean M. Bowman, “The Judicial Article: What Went
Wrong?” 51 Montana Law Review 429, 494 n. 7.
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delegates inspired Chairman Leo Graybill, a Great Falls lawyer, to abandon his
characteristic non-committal attitude and to offer the delegates some advice:
[T]his is, of course, a complicated area and you m ust either
choose to become educated or you must choose to follow
one of the two leads, the majority or the minority
report.. ..[E]ither make up your mind to become educated or
find some bellwether to follow and w ell try and get through
this on Tuesday rather rapidly.so
Delegates seeking knowledgeable “bellwethers” had a large cast to
choose from at the convention. The floor leaders for the debate were Dave
Holland, a 47-year-old Butte lawyer who supported the majority report,
including an elected judiciary, and Ben Berg, a 55-year-old Bozeman lawyer
who wanted an appointed judiciary and supported the minority report.
However, Holland and Berg were not the only lawyers at the convention who
could tutor unschooled delegates. In fact, nearly a quarter—24—of the 100
delegates were lawyers, the largest occupational group represented at the
convention. 5i By contrast, farmers/ranchers, the second largest occupational
group represented, had 19 delegates. 52

50 Montana Constitutional Convention Transcripts, (hereafter
Transcript), 1979, 1057.
51 The preponderance of lawyers was a standing joke at the convention,
and one that was exercised regularly during the debate over the judiciary.
D elegates often facetiously requested one lawyer or another to “translate” a
provision, or joked about the lawyer influence. (“DELEGATE AASHEIM: Mr.
President, could a simple citizen ask a question? (Laughter).”; or, from
Aasheim again, “Mr. President, I’m going to wait until the legal fraternity gets
their arguments settled, then I’m going to ask mine ”) Montana Constitutional
Convention Transcript, (hereafter Transcript), 1979, 1057.
52 “More lawyers, less ranchers,” Billings Gazette, Constitutional
Convention pullout, January 16, 1972, 9.
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Though the whole article inspired division among delegates, the most
divisive issue was judicial selection. Delegate Magnus Aasheim’s motion to
postpone any discussion of Section 2 (powers of the judiciary) until the
Tuesday session indicates the importance delegates attached to the method of
judicial selection;
It looks to me like we’re giving the court powers before we
know how they are to be selected. Now, later on, we are
going to determine whether they are going to be elected by
the people or by some body, and I think—in my judgment,
it would make a difference how much power we are going to
delegate them ... .53
Aasheim’s logic carried the vote on Section 2. After the convention was unable
to come to terms on sections 3 (supreme court organization) or 4 (district court
powers), the delegates voted to adjourn and take up the whole article fresh the
following Tuesday.
Over the weekend, an informal committee of lawyers met to iron out
differences between the minority and majority positions so that the floor
debate would be better managed and less confusing to delegates not as familiar
with the court system. Cedar Aronow and Jack Schiltz, both lawyers and
members of the judiciary committee, met with Berg and James Garlington, a
lawyer from Missoula. Aronow began Tuesday’s debate by outlining the
general compromises this group had arrived at and noting the differences they
could not get around. Among these differences, of course, was judicial
s e l e c t i o n . 54

As the floor debate over selection shows, divergent

53 Ibid., 1043.
54 Ibid., 1069.
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beliefs—strongly held, persuasively argued, and grounded in opposing
principles—underpinned the separation regarding judicial selection among
delegates. The debate further reveals that a lot of the separation sprang from
different ideas about “influence,” and how best to insulate the courts from it.
2. Arguments Favoring an Appointive Plan
The arguments presented to delegates at the convention for appointed
judges involved four main points: (1) the screening committee would produce
better judges because it would study qualifications professionally and
dispassionately; (2) the elective system already in use was not really elective
because so many judges were initially appointed to the bench, then ran as
incumbents, an advantage that nearly always secured their re-election; (3)
accountabihty to voters would actually be improved by the people's
representation on the screening committee, as opposed to the existing
nomination system, which vested full appointment power in the governor; and
(4) judges would have to run on their records, which allowed enough voter
accountability.
Just as Brutus pointed out in the Antifederalist papers of the 1780s, so
delegates to Montana's Constitutional Convention also argued: judges required
a “degree of knowledge” and education, which created unique problems for their
democratic selection. The idea behind the minority report's plan for judicial
selection was system atically to identify, recruit and select good judicial timbre
among the legal community. The judiciary committee's minority report left the
design of the judicial nominating committee to the legislature, but
recommended that the legislature create a large “blue-ribbon” committee, with
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membership statutorily nonpartisan and representative of widely varied
geographical regions. The minority report favored a large committee to reduce
influence by “some vested interest.”^® To secure democratic accountability,
the plan called for senate confirmation of the governor's nominee chosen from
among two to three names submitted by the nominating committee. Finally, in
the first primary election following an appointment, the new judge's name
would appear on the ballot. As a compromise to populism, the minority plan
amended the Montana Plan to provide that any lawyer could run against the
judge in this first primary election. After that, however, judges would run
against their records every four years in the general election.56
Most delegates supporting the appointed judiciary commented about the
inability of the electorate to know enough about judicial candidates to make
good choices. Berg, introducing the minority plan, said good judges are
impartial, skilled and know their business. They must have the courage of
their convictions and be “free from the onslaught of prejudice”—not traits, Berg
argued, that win popularity. Qualities that make a candidate popular would
not necessarily make a good judge, Berg argued. The minority plan was a
superior selection process because candidates would get “a good, thorough
screening” by “eighteen men” bent on finding the most qualified person.^?

55 Ibid., 1023.
^eibid.

57 Ibid., 1024.
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The second major argument voiced by supporters of the minority report
was grounded in the belief that judges were more often initially appointed than
elected under the existing “elective” system. Jean Bowman, a Billings League
of Women Voters activist, addressed this point in the early debate over
selection, complaining that the system was in effect an appointive one marred
by very limited participation: the governor alone selected judges for interim
appointments “without consulting a n y b o d y . ” 58 Further, Bowman said, once
appointed, a judge sat for life because “we [voters], more or less like sheep, go
and reappoint them.”59 Bowman argued that, since the so-called elective
process was in practice a fairly undemocratic appointive one, the minority
recommendations would actually increase democratic involvement.
The arguments about the appointive nature of the elective system
require some statistical explanation. Research on Montana’s elected supreme
court shows that, between 1889 and 1977, 64 percent of supreme court
justices began their tenures with election. However, from the time those
elections became nonpartisan in 1936, the instances of justices gaining seats
initially through election drops to 61 percent. It is widely believed that
incumbency confers an almost insurmountable advantage in judicial elections.
In fact, incumbents in Montana do win supreme court elections easily:
between 1948 and 1985 only one supreme court justice failed to achieve reelection. Yet appointment to the bench does not bestow the incumbency

58 Ibid., 1091.
59/6id., 1031.
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advantage automatically: only seven of fifteen appointees to the supreme
court between 1889 and 1977 who ran for the court following their
appointment regained their seats.^o Whether delegates’ fears about the
advantages of incumbency were real or perceived (four out of the five justice
sitting on the supreme court in 1972 had been appointed originally), these
worries occupied much of the debate over the judiciary.
Finally, delegates touted the minority plan’s requirement that judges run
against their records as sufficient for voter accountability. The minority plan,
Berg said, still leaves the judge “facing a very powerful electorate outside his
door every four years.” This should assuage the fears raised by the majority
that the appointive system would produce arrogant “tyrants,” Berg said. 6i
3. Arguments for Elected Judges
Arguments for elected judges relied on three main supports. The first
was that the judicial powers, especially the powers of the supreme court,
necessitated a popular check. Schiltz underscored the policy-making nature of
the supreme court’s role and its relationship to electoral accountability:
[Ijt’s more important to elect supreme court judges than it
is district court judges. The district court judges aren’t
making policy. And it’s the policy that the supreme court
makes that should be rejected or adopted by the
electorate.. ..[W]e have, with Mr. Holland’s plan [for an
elected judiciary] the W st screening process in the world,
and that is the electorate. 62
60 James J. Lopach, We the People of Montana: the Workings o f Popular
Government, (Missoula, Mont.: Mountain Press, 1983), 156-158.

61 Transcript, 1024.
62

1090.
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Or , as Schiltz wrote in 1993, still defending an elected judiciary, “they should
go to the people periodically to atone for their stewardship.”63 On a more
ideological plane. Cedar Aronow pointed out that “no matter what broad
powers or rights you provide for people in the Bill of Rights, the value of those
rights [is] dependent entirely on how the court interprets them.”64 Aronow's
comment reflects a belief that what the delegates wrote in 1972 would be given
life through court interpretation, and that the judges entrusted with this power
m ust be accountable to the citizens.
The second supporting argument was that election produces the best
judges. Contrary to Berg’s assertion that the electorate was ill-equipped to
identify judicial expertise, Holland suggested that election produces judges who
are politicians, and “the basic attributes of a politician are actually pretty good
for a j u d g e . ” 6 5 “Basically,” Holland elaborated, “what you want is a fair man
who can comprehend what the law is and hope he has enough human
understanding to get b y . ” 6 6 Holland suspected that appointed systems allowed
“arrogance” to creep into the judiciary, and pointed to judges on the federal
bench as an example.

63

John M. Schiltz, Letter to Eileen Sheehy, December 1993.

64 Transcript, 1069.
65 Ibid., 1016.
66 Ibid., 1017.
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The pivotal eirgument regarding elective selection had to do with
influence. This argument gave the majority report the swing vote necessary to
create a majority. Rod Hanson, a Democrat and electric co-op manager from
Fairfield who served on the nine-member committee, said he came to the
convention favoring the appointment process recommended in the Montana
Plan, but changed his position because he decided a judicial nominating
conunission would be particularly susceptible to corporate influence. He had
learned that the sixteen-member commission formed to advise the judiciary
committee—whose bi-partisan appointments by the house of representatives,
senate, supreme court and governor intended to produce an impartial
body—included four attorneys for the Montana Power Company, one of whom
became chairman of the commission.^? Hanson said he voted for an elective
plan because he thought corporate control of a statewide election would be
harder to achieve than corporate control of an eighteen-member committee.
In fact, the minority plan reflected the power of this argument, too.
Rather than commit the design of the nominating committee to the
constitution, Berg found it necessary to leave that design to the legislature.
The reason for this, as various comments in the transcript attest, was that
the judiciary committee could not agree on a design that would insulate the
committee from corporate influence.

67 Ibid., 1027, 1090-91. The 1971 Legislature created the Montana
Constitutional Convention Commission to supply historical, legal and
comparative information about the Montana Constitution to delegates to the
1972 Constitutional Convention.
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Both sides tried to divine the wishes of the electorate as to appointive or
elective system s, and to claim those wishes supported their argument. Berg
said the main people to please with judicial selection were “not judges, but
citizens,” and that the appointive system is what the citizens wanted.68
Bowman argued that to offer the Holland plan to the voters who would
eventually ratify the constitution would be to offer them no choice at all. The
people should be given a chance to vote on an appointive judiciary, she said.69
Holland argued the opposite point: “I submit to you that the people of
this state want to elect their judges and, if we come out of here with an
appointive system .. .this thing alone.. .could bring down the whole
Constitution.”70 Holland cited a variety of polls to support his claim. First, a
survey done by political science students at the University of Montana
February 7-22, 1972, found that 125 of 189 persons questioned rejected
judicial appointment. Although law students polled supported an appointment
process 67-16, a poll of lawyers in general practice favored an elected judiciary
256-241; among trial lawyers, an overwhelming 78-34 favored elected supreme
court justices, with an even higher number favoring elected district court
judges, 82-29.71
^^Ibid., 1022 .
G9Ibid., 1091.
-JOIbid., 1013.
71 Ibid., 1013-1014. Of course, lawyers’ desire to have judges elected
may not spring entirely from devotion to democratic principles, a subject
covered in greater detail on pages 50-56.
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After several inconclusive votes on selection, the convention finally
agreed unanimously on the compromise provisions that form the current
system for judicial selection in Montana. Under the current plan, judges are
elected in an open election if no incumbent files. Incumbents may face
challengers in both the primary and general election. If no challenger files
against the incumbent, the incumbent must face the voters as an ‘‘accept or
reject” option. Other vacancies are filled through gubernatorial appointment,
but the governor is advised by a nominating commission whose membership is
statutorily defined; the senate confirms judicial appointments. While this
system is in some ways a hybrid of the majority and minority proposals, it is
basically an elective plan.
4.

The Battle for Publicly Financed Judicial Elections

The question of corporate influence—or influence of any contributor to a
judicial campaign—gave rise to the most interesting debate on judicial
selection, the debate over public financing of judicial campaigns. A provision
for publicly financed supreme court campaigns narrowly missed inclusion in
the constitution, finally defeated on March 16—after a dramatic call of the
convention to round up two missing delegates—in a 49-48 vote."^2 (Although
the majority of those voting favored the provision. Rule 51 of the convention
stated that provisions included in the constitution had to pass by a majority of
the elected delegates, a majority of 51.) The final vote came after the idea was
voted in and out of the proposed constitution two different times.

2453.
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Public financing of judicial elections was proposed by Billings lawyer
John Schiltz, a Democrat who had suffered a landslide defeat in an attempt to
unseat C hief Justice James Harrison in 1970. Schiltz lost to Harrison 89,171
to 28,568, after running on a platform that Harrison’s campaign contributions
from corporate interests affected his decisions. Schiltz accepted no campaign
contributions from lawyers. Schiltz submitted his proposal that all state
judicial campaigns be publicly funded as a separate minority report from the
judiciary committee on which he served. It was first debated on February 29,
after the delegates had voted on the rest of the substance of the judicial article.
It passed 46-45. Later the same day, the delegates reconsidered the provision;
in its last action of the day the convention voted 49-47 to delete the section
providing for publicly financed judicial campaigns. On March 13, with 11
delegates absent, the convention voted 55-32 in favor of a revised provision
that allowed for public financing of only supreme court elections. The new
provision went to the Style and Drafting Committee, but was defeated March
16 in the dramatic vote that closed the final debate on the judicial article as a
whole.
The close votes on the section and its roller-coaster trip through the
subparagraphs of Roberts Rules of Order attest to the vigorous interest
delegates had in the publicly financed elections, an idea which at the time was
entirely new. Publicly financed presidential elections were still two years
away, and the Watergate scandal, with its links to campaign finance and
eventual campaign finance reform, was in its embryonic stages. D elegates’
comments on the provision reveal that, again, the central issue dividing
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delegates was “independence,” particularly independence from influence, either
perceived or real.
Schiltz argued that any discussion of independence for the judiciary
needed to address lawyers’ campaign contributions. “[T]his is your sole source
of campaign funds when you’re running for the Supreme Court. You either
have lawyers who give it to you in case you’d win or you have lawyers who are
afraid not to give it to you or you get it from lawyers who are genuinely
interested in your philosophy of what a court out to be.”73 Assuring the
“purity of our judges” could best be accomplished by eliminating lawyers as the
main source of campaign donations, Schiltz a r g u e d . 7 4
Not only did delegates fear the influence of lawyers who contributed to
judicial campaigns, but, again, they greatly feared corporate influence.
Graybill stepped down from the chair in order to comment on this issue. Trying
to save the provision on its reconsideration on February 29, Graybill argued:
[T]he whole issue is are we going to let the Judiciary
continue to get its money to run for contested Supreme
Court offices by getting it from big.. corporations and
concerns who have a lot of litigation in the Supreme
Court?.. .[T]he Supreme Court ought to be a place where
the few clients who use it a lot ought not to be able to
contribute large sums to a Supreme Court c a n d i d a t e . . .
In a similar vein, arguing March 13 for the revised provision that affected
supreme court elections only, Wade Dahood, a lawyer from Anaconda, said.

73 Ibid., 1026.
74 Ibid., 1137.
75 iW ., 1167.
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“The taxpayer, above all, should have paramount interest in this proposal. He
is the one that is affected by the quality of justice more than anyone else.”
Dahood went on to detail the many cases decided in the supreme court that pit
the interests of “ordinary taxpayers” against those of corporations—tax cases,
assessm ent cases, zoning c a s e s . . . B o t h Dahood and Graybill saw public
campaign financing as a tool by which the interests of “ordinary taxpayers”
could be protected from the influence exerted by Montana’s big corporations,
whose interest in the court was naturally greater than any citizen’s because
the corporations appeared as parties in the supreme court more often.
Though publicly funded judicial campaigns failed to achieve
constitutional status, the idea was tried on a small scale for a brief time.
Between 1975 and 1993 campaigns for supreme court seats were given a
share of the state’s public campaign fund. The money for this fund came from
voluntary contributions from taxpayers who indicated their support through a
check-off box on their Montana tax returns. Since “volunteering” funds this
way m eant paying money to the fund over and above one’s tax burden,
participation was not high.77 The fund was eliminated in the 1993 session of
the legislature because it had attracted a scant $1,600 per year, $1,200 less
than the Department of Revenue claimed the fund’s administration cost the
The $1,600 had to be divided among candidates for the judiciary and

s t a t e .7 8

iQIbid., 2201 .
77

M inutes, House Appropriations Committee, March 29, 1993, 4.

78/6id., 3.
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for governor and lieutenant governor. This experiment with publicly ûnanced
elections clearly failed, but perhaps only because the voluntary nature of the
contributions doomed the program from the start.
C.

CONCLUSIONS

The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention could not
agree how to solve the problem of influence in supreme court selection. They
chose to retain an elective process at least in part to thwart such influence,
then they narrowly defeated public financing of those elections. Montana
history appears to show that judicial elections were more competitive when
they were partisan. Since eliminating the elective process is probably unlikely,
the next area of study will be an examination of the election of judges in
practice, with emphasis on the election’s competitive qualities and its
susceptibility to influence.
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CHAPTER THREE
JUSTICES’ EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE
ASPECTS OF MONTANA’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
There is no perfect system of judicial selection. On that much justices
agree. But the relative imperfections of the two main system s—appointive
and elective—offer justices ample room for disagreement. Each justice finds
specific imperfections distressing. One complains that the electorate is poorly
informed and too demanding; another that the Judicial Nomination
Commission is staffed by political hacks. The questions raised by justices who
have experienced judicial selection firsthand reflect the same conundrum that
stymied the framers in 1789: how can the judiciary be responsive to people
while maintaining judicial independence and impartiality? The state’s
constitutional framers offered a hybrid system of appointment and election as
a practical solution to this dilemma. One justice has called their solution the
worst of any of the fifty states.?^ Another justice sums up the problem of
balancing the competing values of independence and accountability: it is not
that there is no good system for choosing judges, but there is no perfect
system , and the advantages of one system tend to be the reverse of the
advantages over the other.^o

79 Lopach, 150. The sentim ent is Justice John C. Harrison’s.
80 Karla M. Gray, interview by author, Tape recording, Helena,
Montana, March 11, 1994. Transcript, 2.
40
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The issues that separated Antifederalists from Federalists in 1789 and
Montana’s constitutional framers Dave Holland and Dan Berg in 1972 also
separate justices on the Montana Supreme Court today. Just as beliefs among
constitutional framers writing almost 200 years apart turned on their
individual views of the policy-making role of the judiciary, so with some of
Montana’s justices. Not surprisingly, the justice who views the court’s policy
making power to be narrow and confined is more comfortable with an
appointive judicial selection process. The justice who believes the court makes
policy “every day of the week ”prefers the elective process of selection. Within
the election process there is room for further division of opinion among those
m ost intim ately familiar with it. Some justices favor vigorous campaign
debate; others feel more confined by the Canons of Judicial Ethics. All three of
the justices interviewed felt uncomfortable with the current system of judicial
election finance.
A. VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING POWERS
DEFINE JUSTICES’ VIEWS ON ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PUBLIC
Justices view the role of the court differently. Chief Justice Jean
Tum age, who was elected to the court in 1984 to replace Chief Justice Frank
Haswell, described the court’s policy-making power as extremely limited.
“Under our constitution we cannot legislate, but we can create law .. .when
there is no legislation to cover that matter,” Tumage said. “If we will uphold
our oath of office we must recognize that people create the law through their
legislature and not through the courts.”?? Justice Karla Gray, appointed
?? Chief Justice Jean A. Tumage, interview by author, Telephone
interview, Billings, Montana, February 28, 1994.
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initially in 1991 to fill a midterm vacancy created by the resignation of Diane
Barz, echoes Tum age’s view of the strictures placed on judicial policy-making.
“Our policy-making role is a very small part of what we do. There are cases
certainly where we do make policy directly.... But those are primarily sort of
development-of-the-common-law kinds of issues. And they are relatively few
and far between.”'^® Justice Terry Trieweiler, who was elected initially in 1990
and then tried unsuccessfully to unseat Chief Justice Tumage in the 1992
election, differs sharply from Tumage and Gray;
[W]e make policy every time we decide a gray area of the law. I
agree that if a statute is clear then we have no business varying
from its plain language. But if it's clear it doesn’t often get up
here. The only reason it usually gets here is because it’s unclear
and in order to apply it we need to apply our own value system to
arrive at what we think is the proper result.... Everybody who is
here knows we do that every day of the week. What they don’t
want you to know is that they’re doing it from a value system
different from y o u r s . 7 9
With views on their roles this widely separated, it is scarcely surprising
to find Trieweiler on the opposite end of the spectrum from Tumage and Gray
regarding judicial selection processes. Trieweiler’s support for the elective
process is much more vigorous than either Tumage’s or Gray’s. Tumage
takes a realist’s position regarding the merits of elective system s versus those
of appointive ones. “In Montana there is little or no possibihty of appointed
judges. We are a state that wants to and will hang on to the right to vote for
people, including judges,” Tumage said. He pointed out that the state requires
78 Gray interview transcript, 3.
79 Terry N. Trieweiler, interview by author, Tape recording, Helena
Montana, March 11, 1994. Transcript, 20.
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appointed judges to run “promptly,” at the first statewide election following
their appointment. Yet Tumage is critical of appointive system s in general,
noting that “no one yet has come up with a sanitized method of appointment.”
Tum age said appointment processes tend to be tainted by partisan politics.so
Gray favors an appointive judiciary over an elected judiciary, but
strongly criticizes the federal system of appointment because of its life
tenures.81 Gray would prefer a variation on the Missouri Plan, with a provision
for retention elections. She adamantly suggests that the appointing body have
“plenty of public input,” including a provision for open meetings.82
Trieweiler’s view is the polar opposite.83 “[T]he appointive judiciary is a
farce,” he said. “I think it’s much more political than elections.”®^ Trieweiler
holds that appointed justices become better judges after they face an election
because “an election is a very humanizing experience. It’s a very leveling
experience.... You do humbling things day after day after day. And that makes
you a better person. It gives you a broader, a deeper perspective, a greater

80 Tumage interview.
81 Gray interview transcript, 5.
82 Ibid., 14.
83 Interestingly, Gray, who favors an appointment system of judicial
selection, first won her seat on the court through appointment. She says she
doubts she would have served on the court if she had had to run in the first
instance. (Gray interview transcript, 1.) Conversely, Trieweiler, who favors an
elective system first won his seat through election, and says he doubts he
could ever have been appointed. (Trieweiler interview transcript, 9.)
84 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
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range of v i s i o n . ” 85 Trieweiler offered as an example his belief that he is a
better judge on tribal jurisdiction issues as a result of campaigns which forced
him to m eet with tribes on Montana’s seven reservations.
Gray shared some of Trieweiler’s beliefs about the effect of elections on
judges, but said that retention elections were sufficient to provide the benefits
of the election process.

think it is a good idea, even though we are not a

political body and are not supposed to take popularity polls on the issue[s] and
then vote accordingly. The system where you never have to go out there and
m eet Montanans, I mean real live people, and ask them for their vote and their
support— I think it’s important that we keep that,” she

s a i d . 86

However, Gray’s view of the role of a justice in the political process
limited her willingness to give all the selection power to the people. She
identified several pitfalls awaiting justices on the campaign trail. Voters are
accustomed to electing representatives and to holding their elected officials
accountable for their representation. Voters who do not believe their legislator,
governor or city council member is representing their views are entitled to
unseat those representatives. Although Montana’s justices are elected and
m ust campaign fike any other elected official seeking support, Gray points out
that justices “are not elected to respond to the public w ill.. or what a majority
of people in a district or in the state.. might think about a given issue on any

85 Ibid., 8.
86 Gray interview transcript, 6.
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given day.... People are not supposed to call us and lobby us for r e s u l t s . ”®?
Gray's experience campaigning taught her that voters do not readily accept
the difference between her candidacy for the supreme court and someone else’s
candidacy for the state legislature. “To most voters if you’re running for
election you’re a politician. If you’re a politician they can and should hold your
feet to the fire about your views on everything from soup to nuts.”®® Gray said
voters get frustrated when judicial candidates cannot answer some questions
because of judicial ethics and cannot make any campaign promises.
B.

JUDICIAL ETHICS AND CAMPAIGNING JUSTICES

The strictures placed on judicial candidates by the Canons of Judicial
Ethics raise difficulties for campaigning justices. The race between Tumage
and Trieweiler in 1992 spotlighted these issues vividly. In a campaign called
“nasty” in news accounts,®9 the candidates split early and decisively over the
scope of allowable comment under the Canons of Judicial E t h i c s . A f t e r
appearing together at a meeting of the Senior Citizens Association in Conrad
®7 Gray interview transcript, 2.
88 Ibid., 3.
89 Loma Thackeray, “Trieweiler snipes at Tumage for skipping debate,”
The Billings Gazette, September 26, 1992, 3B.
90 The canons’ provision on candidacy for office states: “A candidate for
judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for him, promises of
conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or
electing power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on
disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office
w ith bias, partiality or improper discrimination.” Lawyers' Deskbook &
Directory 1991-1992 (Helena, Montana: State Bar of Montana), 266.
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August 29, 1992, each candidate hurled charges of impropriety at the other,
including accusations of violations of the canons. Tumage claimed, among
other things, that Trieweiler acted unethically by discussing a case before the
high court. Trieweiler said he made only a passing reference to the case in
question, a May 1990 decision in which the court limited the amount of money
that can be awarded when contracts are broken. He said he addressed more
fully a case regarding tax refunds to federal retirees. Since no official record of
the m eeting was kept, there was no definitive answer about the charges and
countercharges.91 The candidates never appeared together again. In late
September, Trieweiler publicly criticized Tumage for missing a scheduled joint
appearance before the Yellowstone County Bar Association. Association
president Rick Cebull read a letter from Tumage excusing his absence. The
letter explained that Tumage had a previous commitment in W estem
Montana and again accused Trieweiler of referring to pending c a s e s . 9 2 The
pending cases remained unnamed and the voters were not informed beyond the
newspaper account detailing Tumage’s complaints about Trieweiler and
Trieweiler’s equally damning complaints about Tumage.
If voters relied on press accounts to inform them about the division
between Trieweiler and Tumage regarding the Canons of Judicial Ethics, they
were not only underinformed, but were almost certainly confused by a canon
that would not allow comment on certain cases or issues, yet was apparently
91 “Justice candidates trade accusations again,” The Billings Gazette,
September 2, 1992, B l.
92 Thackeray, “Trieweiler snipes...,”pp. cit., 3B.
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m ute regarding personal attacks. Though press accounts were sketchy with
details of supporting arguments behind charges of ethical violations of the
canons, they documented generously the personal charges and countercharges
leveled as the campaign unfolded. These charges included: Trieweiler decrying
Tum age’s participation in bank cases while serving on a bank board and
Tum age’s reply that Trieweiler improperly represented him self at the high
court in a case involving a dispute with Trieweiler’s Whitefish neighbors;93
Tum age’s claim that Trieweiler hoped to unseat him in order to pack the court
with “former trial lawyers such as himself” and Trieweiler’s answer that such
a charge “would really be s t u p i d ” ;94 Trieweiler’s counter-claim that Tumage
“run[s] this court like the Legislature rather than a court” and that Tumage
had too close a political relationship with the current govemor Stan
S te p h e n s;9 5

and Tum age’s salvo that Trieweiler’s “very big ego” and deep

pockets were the driving forces behind his candidacy.96 Though each news
story reflected an effort to get to the bottom of each of the charges flung, the
overwhelming weight of the coverage reflected a campaign rightly called
“n a sty .”
93 “Justice candidates trade accusations again,” The Billings Gazette,
September 2, 1992, B l.
94 Bill Skidmore, “Tumage says Trieweiler seeks to ‘pack’ high court,”
The Billings Gazette, September 30, 1992, 5C.
95 Skidmore, “Court candidates trade charges, ”The Billings Gazette,
June 26, 1992, 2B.
96 “Tumage lashes out at Trieweiler,” The Billings Gazette, June 24,
1992, 8A.
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In the waning days of the campaign the Lee Enterprise newspapers
commissioned a poll of voters which revealed that Trieweiler’s decisive edge
over Tum age in the primary (56 percent to 44 percent) was gone. In its place
was a race too close to call, with roughly 18 percent of the voters registering
“unfavorable name recognition” to both candidates.^? Trieweiler ended up the
loser, by a margin so close (194,747 to 193,706) that he considered asking for a
recount.98
If this is what elections for the supreme court can be, is the elective
process healthy? Tumage said the press’ natural inclination to emphasize
confrontation rather than consensus (“someone could be elevated to sainthood
in Bilhngs and they wouldn’t pay any attention to it”) did not damage the court.
Further, he said the coverage of the campaign, while lamentably not “a really
scholarly job,” did produce an informed electorate. However, Tumage said he
would be happier with press coverage that analyzed the role of the court in
peoples’ lives.99 Trieweiler also expressed some dissatisfaction with press
coverage, particularly of the campaign’s financingioo and what he felt was too
shallow a treatment of the competing judicial philosophies of the candidates, loi
97 Jim Gransbery, “Justices nearly tied,” The Billings Gazette, October
21, 1992, lA.
98 “Defeated Trieweiler may ask recount,” The Billings Gazette,
November 4, 1992, 2B.
99 Tumage interview.
100

Trieweiler interview transcript, 12.

101 Ibid., 17-18.
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But he said the “high profile” election produced a better informed electorate
than m ost judicial races and a population certainly better informed than it is
through an appointive process: “It wasn’t good for me—I hated it—but I think
it was really good. I think it was the best thing that ever happened to people in
this state in terms of learning something about their judiciary.”i02
Furthermore, Trieweiler said he thinks his races, particularly the first one in
1990 against former Attorney General Mike Greeley, “raised the level of
consciousness about the courts and the court” and would encourage other
attorneys to run for the court. 103 Trieweiler said his victory over Greeley
proved that a political unknown could defeat a “strong political figure” in a
court race. 104
Not surprisingly, Tumage and Trieweiler have vastly different opinions
today about allowable comment under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Tum age’s interpretation of the canons would preclude most comment on
cases. Tum age believes future cases, current cases and past cases are off
lim its to campaign debate. Justices “can’t talk about [the cases] that were
there because they come back, not as the same case but as the same issue,”
Tum age said. Tum age said the reason the canons were adopted “was to keep
[justices] from promising voters that they’d go along with them, vote their
way. This would not only be pre-deciding issues, but selling your vote. Justice

102 Ibid., 11.
103/6 id , 9.
104/6 id , 10.
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is not for sale.”i05 Tum age’s moral certainty about the issue of campaign
debate places any issue that might come before the court out of the realm of
candidates’ comment.
Trieweiler’s view, held with as much moral conviction, is much broader.
“There’s no canon.. that prevents you from discussing decisions that you’ve
already made.”i 06 Trieweiler said candidates who have not been on the court
and have no record have a problem because they can address only what they
m ight do prospectively, but he said voters can and should compare the voting
records of judicial candidates and “ask them why they did what they did.”
Their votes and reasoning are a matter of public record, anyway, because
votes and reasoning form the essence of judicial opinions, he said.io?
C.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Winning—and even losing— a “high profile” statewide election takes
money, and the source of money for supreme court elections remains a
sticking point for many of the same reasons raised by Montana convention
delegates in 1972. Then the fear was of corporate influence. Today, in addition
to fear of corporate influence, there is a strong sentiment that the plaintiffs’
bar—lawyers making their livelihood from damage awards to plaintiffs-—may
try to “buy” supreme court elections.

105 Tumage interview.
106

Trieweiler interview transcript, 18.

107 Ibid., 19.
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The finances of the Tumage-Trieweiler race offer a good example of the
problems inherent in financing a judicial campaign. Trieweiler raised $163,434
and spent $163,229. Tum age raised $209,404 and spent $209,304. By
contrast, Attorney General Joe Mazurek raised and spent about $105,000
defeating Republican challenger Jack Sands. Karla Gray, running to keep her
seat against lukewarm opposition from Joseph Nascimento, raised about
$65,000. Nascimento raised roughly $2,000, most of it his own m

oney,

los

Lawyers or their spouses who contributed more than $35 accounted for about
68 percent of Trieweiler’s total contributions. They contributed $92,585,
many contributing the meudmum allowable $750. Tumage raised almost
$40,000 from lawyers contributing more than $35, or 20 percent of those
contributions to his campaign. Other identifiable constituencies appearing on
Tum age’s campaign contributors’ list are banker/broker/investor/CPA
contributions totzdUng just over $17,700 (9 percent of his contributions over
$35); and doctors and hospital interests, who contributed $20,187 (10 percent).
The PAC contributions are even more revealing. Trieweiler picked up
the maximum allowable contribution, $2,000, from the Montana Education
Association, the state’s largest teachers union, and from a group called
Montana Law-PAC. He received $1,000 apiece from the Chauffeurs
Teamsters & Helpers and the Friends of Max Baucus. Local teachers unions
in Billings, Butte, Glendive, Great Falls, Helena and Missoula all contributed
sm aller amounts ranging from $100 to $900. He also picked up contributions
108 “Court race draws money,” The Billings Gazette, October 20, 1992,
7A; “Challenger runs to make a point,” The Billings Gazette, October 31, 1992,
2B.
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from the state AFL-CIO and union organizations in Spokane and Cleveland.
T um age’s $2,000 PAG contributions came from the Contractors of Montana,
the Medical PAC and the Montana Auto Dealers PAC. The Realtors PAC
donated $1,000. Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather and Dorsey Whitney,
large Billings firms with corporate clients, donated $1,500 and $1,000
respectively through their PAC’s. Other PAC contributions to Tumage ranged
from $96.76 to $750 and came from the Montana Independent Bankers
Association, First Bank System, Norwest (Bank) State PAC, Atlantic
Richfield, Burlington Northern and the Plum Creek Good Government Fund in
Seattle. 109
The sources of this money are clearly identifiable as separate interests.
Business interests, large law firms specializing in defending insurance
companies, medical interests—traditional Republican
constituencies—contributed to Tumage. Labor unions, plaintiffs’ attorneys,
even Montana’s Democratic Senator—traditional Democratic
constituencies—contributed to Trieweiler. Significantly, Trieweileris
contributions lagged behind Tumage’s to the extent that, after the poll results
showing the race to be a dead heat were released in late October, Trieweiler put
$17,950 of his own money into his campaign.
Tumage, who made an issue out of campaign financing by charging
Trieweiler with trying to buy the election, says he cannot say today who gave
money to his campaign. “I would hope that’s typical,” he said, because it would
109 All judicial campaign finance information is from the official reports
filed with the state Fair Campaign Practices office, Ed Argenbright,
commissioner.
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be “a gross violation of your oath of office to keep track” and favor
contributors. Tumage said he doubted the contributions by lawyers to him and
Trieweiler could accurately be documented as “plaintiffs” and “defense”
attorney money because most Montana law firms—indeed, most Montana
lawyers—do not isolate their practice to only defense or plaintiffs work. In
fact, Tum age believes most lawyers have less interest in the supreme court
elections than in district court elections simply because most lawyers do not
come before the supreme court. Of the 3,500 lawyers licensed to practice in
Montana, Tumage says only 500 or so are in court regularly. Tumage said the
outcome of the supreme court race will not improve odds for either plaintiffs or
defense attom eys. “There may be some feeling among those actively litigating
that they have an interest in the outcome” of the election, Tumage said,
particularly among “the plaintiffs bar because they want bigger and better
law suits.” But Tumage said both defense and plaintiffs attom eys, if the bar
could be divided as such, share an overriding common interest in more
litigation. Electing one justice or another would not affect that overriding
common goal, Tumage said.no
Trieweiler differed. Calling campaign financing “the only problem 1 have
with the elective judiciary,”! 11 he said his ability to raise money was hampered
“because 1 don’t have a wealthy constituency, other than lawyers.”! 12

110

Tumage interview.

111 Trieweiler interview transcript, 2.
112

76W., 3.
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Further, Trieweiler thought that campaign contributions do buy something,
not something as grossly wrong as a justice’s vote on a case, but something
more subtle. He said he frequently has “major contributors on both sides of
the case, so all of the time you are voting against people who are major
contributors.” However he pointed out that not every case that comes before
the court gets the same degree of attention because there is so much work to
do. Cases involving friends or lawyers he thinks highly of will get more careful
attention, Trieweiler said. However, Trieweiler did not see an effort to buy
“influence”—if that means buying a justice’s vote—as the major motivator
behind campaign contributions. The reason lawyers give, and the reason the
money from plaintiffs attomeys goes to one camp while defense attomeys
contribute to another, is because the contributors believe they are giving to a
person whose philosophy is similar to their own. “We end up getting supported
by people who think the way we do. .. .[Blankers support Tumage because
Tumage is a banker. He comes to the court thinking like a banker and they
know that and that’s why they support him. He doesn’t think like a banker
because he got contributions from b a n k e r s . ” H 3
Tumage, Trieweiler and Gray all doubted that lawyers’ “interest” in the
outcome of a judicial election amounted to their influence over the court’s
decisions. ‘W e necessarily have to take money from lawyers because the
general public is not interested enough or doesn’t understand enough to care
enough to be involved in a judicial campaign, especially [a supreme court

113 Ibid., 13-14.
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campaign],” Gray said. “And so we take money from ail kinds of lawyers. And
they come up here and they lose cases.”H4
Tumage noted that campaign contributions are one way of gaining voice
in a nation devoted to free speech. For example, Tumage said, teachers
contribute to candidates for the superintendent of the office of public
instmction, and no one would suggest that the teachers' interest in the
outcome of that race should preclude their contributions, u s
Finally, Trieweiler said that limitations on campaign contributions and
publicizing them cuts the effect of contributors’ influence on the court. “If
somebody could contribute $50,000 to a candidate they could probably buy an
awful lot of influence, but when an individual can only contribute $750—no one
is going to risk their career for a $750 contribution. Even though they might
really appreciate it, and think fondly of that person, they are not going to
jeopardize their future for a $750

c o n t r ib u t io n .”H 6

Campaign expenditures offer another field for examination. Given that
court issues are complicated, 30-second spots on television and radio, which
are the biggest expense in court campaigns, may not add anything significant
to voters’ understanding of the court. Tumage, who hired Fifth Avenue
Advertising in Helena to handle all his media advertising for $64,000, said one
problem he has with the elective system is that a candidate with money can

114 Gray interview transcript, 6-7.
115 Tumage interview.
116

Trieweiler interview transcript, 16.
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“overwhelm the voters with a media blast "n? Trieweiler, on the other hand,
who spent around $69,000 on radio and TV advertising, views advertising as “a
good way to overcome an unfair advantage that your opponent might have
because of that person’s political

c o n n e c t i o n s . ” us

Although all of the justices had some reservations about public
financing of judicial elections, they all favored it in principle. Trieweiler noted
that the provisions for qualifying for the money would be critical. Tumage said
he doubted that Montana, with the many burdens on its budget, would be able
adequately to fund statewide judicial campaigns, though he thought the idea a
good one as long as the funds were limited and accepting the funds meant that
you could not put other money into the campaign.
D. THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS
The appointment process, which has filled six out of the 15 judicial
openings since the 1973 creation of the Judicial Nomination Commission,
raises a spate of different questions. Recent controversies focus on two
problems with Montana’s appointment system. The first involves the method
members of the Judicial Nomination Commission use to fill supreme court
vacancies. The second centers on the selection of members of the nominating
commission itself.
First, when James Nelson of Cut Bank was appointed to the supreme
court by Govemor Marc Racicot in April 1993, the political division among

117 Tumage interview.
118

Trieweiler interview transcript, 17.
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members of the Judicial Nomination Commission became public knowledge.
The tally sheet submitted to the govemor by the Judicial Nomination
Commission was pubhshed in newspapers statewide April 9, 1993. It showed
that four of the commissioners rated Roger Tippy of Helena first among the
nine applicants who survived the commission’s first cut, while three of the
commissioners rated Tippy either last or eighth among the nine finalists.
Tippy had been Tumage’s campaign manager in the Tumage-Trieweiler race.
Charles Johnson, the Lee Newspapers Bureau Chief, relied on handwriting
comparisons and analysis by “court watchers” to determine that the firstplace votes came from the commission’s four non-attomeys, all appointed by
Stan Stephens, the Republican govemor Trieweiler had accused Tumage of
being too familiar with. The last-place and eighth-place votes were believed to
be from the commission’s two lawyers, appointed by the state supreme court,
and the commission chairman. District Judge James Sorte, chosen by his
fellow district judges. James Regnier, a Missoula lawyer, received first- or
second-place votes from the commissioners who rated Tippy at the bottom
and seventh-, eighth- or ninth-place votes from three of the four other
commissioners. One commissioner rated Tippy first and Regnier second, but
the rest of the votes follow a similar pattem: if Tippy was at the top of a
commissioner’s list, Regnier was at the bottom and vice versa.
The result of such a voting procedure, assuming that the commission
does contain a number of loyal party appointees, is that the candidate least
offensive to either side will get the commission’s highest recommendation. In
this case, that was Richard Ranney of Missoula, who got one first-place vote,
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two second-place votes, three fourth-place votes and a sixth-place vote. The
fact that the commission must send at least three names and may send up to
five names to the govemor and that the govemor must choose from this list
checks this weakness in the procedure. The names of both Regnier and Tippy
were submitted to the govemor, along with Ranneys, Gerald Allen’s and
James Nelson’s . T h e govemor chose Nelson April 16 from among this
group. Nelson was the lowest-rated of the five candidates whose names were
submitted under the commission’s procedure. Racicot’s decision was made
after the press reports revealed the divided voting among commission
members.
The division among commissioners involved in the Nelson appointment
hints at problems with the selection of members of the Judicial Nomination
Commission. The legislature amended the statute governing the membership
of the commission in 1991, allowing for staggered terms. As Johnson pointed
out in his April 9 news article, the Judicial Nomination Commission was
structured with terms that meant the sitting govemor chose judges from lists
submitted by a commission dominated by his predecessor’s appointees.
“Through most of his term, Republican Stephens, for example, got
recommendations from a commission on which four of the seven members
were appointed by his predecessor, Democratic Gov. Ted Schwinden,” Johnson
wrote. 120 However, Stephens, having complained about the choices given him
119 Charles S. Johnson, “Tally shows split on judicial commission,” The
Billings Gazette, April 9, 1993, 3C.
120

Ibid.
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by the commission, urged the 1991 Legislature to change the terms, which it
did. One member of that commission said that the Legislature intended to get
rid of all the sitting commissioners in 1991. But since the supreme court
appointed the lawyer members, the Legislature had to settle for ousting the
lay members only, 121 The 1991 change meant Stephens could appoint all new
lay members, the result of which appears on the April 1993 tally sheet.
Controversy around the membership of the commission brewed again in
January 1994 when the supreme court made its two appointments to the
body. This time, Trieweiler accused Tumage of trying to stack the commission
by replacing the two members without fully involving the court’s other six
j u d g e s . 122

Trieweiler claims that appointments to the judicial nominating

commission in the past were done after a conference discussion. In this
instance, however, Trieweiler says Tumage proposed replacements for sitting
members Robert James and C.W. Leaphart Jr. without conference discussion.
Tumage got five signatures on the order replacing Leaphart and James before
Trieweiler knew the appointment was being c o n s i d e r e d . 123 Trieweiler, who is
the only justice not to have signed the order, publicly charged Tumage with an

C.W. William Leaphart Jr., interview by author, Telephone
interview, Billings, Montana, March 22, 1994.
121

122 Charles S. Johnson, “Trieweiler: Tumage tactic stacks panel on
judiciary,” The Billings Gazette, January 14, 1994, 3C.

123 Trieweiler interview transcript, 4.
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effort to pack the commission with members who shared Tumage’s philosophy
,1 2 4

These problems with the makeup of the nominating commission aside, it
should be noted that every justice interviewed believed James Nelson to be a
good appointment. Therefore, even a highly partisan commission cannot
completely control the outcome of the selection. Furthermore, Gray said she
preferred an appointed judiciaiy to an elected one because “the kinds of things
that you have to be good at to get elected in the first instance are not
necessarily the kinds of things that make you a g o o d

j u d g e . ” i2 5

Gray said a

nominating commission is a better screen for the kinds of qualities that do
make good justice, including community involvement. “Unless you’ve been the
kind of lawyer whose cases are more often in the public eye and get a lot of
media attention,” it is hard to build the statewide constituency that could win
you an election, she

s a i d . 126

sh e preferred the odds with a nominating

commission.
As Gray pointed out in the beginning, no system is perfect and the
advantages of one tend to be the disadvantages of the other. The nominating
commission may be susceptible to cronyism, but it allows a relatively unknown
figure politically, like Gray, an opportunity to interview for and land a
job she wants and—according to lawyers on both sides of the defense/plaintiffs

124 Johnson, “Trieweiler: Tumage...”
125 Gray interview transcript, 13-14.
126 Ibid., 1 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
divide—is good at. Yet Trieweiler, who also wanted the job very much, doubted
the nomination system would ever choose him, and advocates doing away with
it altogether in favor of the “survival of the fittest” aspects of the election
method.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Justice Gray’s observation that each method of judicial selection has
strengths and weaknesses, and that the strengths of the elective method tend
to be the inverse of those of the appointive method and vice versa, provides the
best beginning point from which to offer conclusions and recommendations.
Anyone’s recommendations regarding judicial selection will be predicated on the
relative value the observer assigns to the competing elements that define the
judiciary in a democracy. The resultant balance will either favor popular
checks on judicial power or place greater weight on what Gray called “the truly
critical independence and impartiality of the j u d i c i a r y . ” 127 One’s view of the
policy-making power of the court profoundly affects one’s beliefs about how
much authority the public should have over the selection of judges. But those
views probably arise out of an even more fundamental source. John Schiltz,
arguing before Montana’s Constitutional Convention that the electorate
provides “the best screening process in the world,” 128 Terry Trieweiler saying
that “I have a lot more faith in the electorate than 1 have in nominating
c o m m i s s i o n s ”i2 9

— even Gordon Wood writing about the politics of the 1780s

— may be reacting as much to a heartfelt belief in populism as to a

i27Gray interview transcript, 2.
128

Transcript, 1090.

129 Trieweiler interview transcript, 7.
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dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. Similarly Gray—and Alexander
Hamilton, for that matter—may be predisposed to view with suspicion “the
people” as evaluators of judicial quality. Both sides are equally right. The
analyst is left with Madison McClellan’s recomendation that the variables in
the selection process should be analyzed not for their purposes but for their
results, because the methods may not produce the intended results.
A.

THE ELECTION PROCESS PREFERRED

Evidence from Montana’s recent judicial selections suggests that
election is a superior system to the appointive system used in Montana.
Naturally, this conclusion is not without qualification. There is no perfect
system. But overall, the weaknesses of the elective system as practiced are
less damaging than the weaknesses of the appointive system as practiced.
The weaknesses of both systems can be analyzed and compared when divided
into the following categories: (1) the importance of “influence,” defined here as
the desire of (and relative success of) various groups to control the selection
process; (2) the extent of justices’ policy-making power and its effect on how
justices should be chosen in a democratic society; (3) the relative abilities of
the electorate or a nominating commission to find and select good justices; (4)
whether judicial independence can be secured in an elective system.
1. The Importance of “Influence”
Both the elective and appointive systems are susceptible to
influence—that is, the desire of various groups to control the outcome of the
selection process—but of different kinds, or from different groups. The major
problem affecting the elective process is summed up in Chief Justice Tumage’s
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complaint that a candidate with a lot of money can “overwhelm the voters
with a media blast.”i30 Since races for the supreme court are statewide, a
vigorously contested race costs at least $150,000. Both Tumage and
Trieweiler spent over that amount in 1992. Whether this money comes from
lawyers, as it did with Trieweiler, or from traditional Republican constituencies,
as it did with Tumage, one cannot assume it comes without strings. Lawyers
who, in combination with their spouses, contributed $1,500 to Trieweiler’s
campaign certainly expected to get something out of that investment.
Probably they expected nothing more than to elect a kindred spirit to a court
that does have a significant role to play in their livelihood. Also, Tumage’s
campaign contributors might be sorry to discover that he has no idea who they
are. Though civic spirit is not to be completely discounted as a motivator for
campaign contributions, it is doubtful that pure civic-mindedness could
account for $200,000 in campaign contributions.
The biggest weakness to the elective system is campaign financing. A
lot of money poured into a judicial campaign does influence the outcome of the
election. In this respect Chief Justice Tumage is wrong: justice, at least in
terms of seats on the supreme court, certainly is for sale. It costs about
$200,000. However, it is being sold at a competitive auction to many people
for relatively small amounts. The competitive aspect of the fundraising may
be the best protection people can hope for against one interest controlling the
process. Though Trieweiler’s constituency—clearly identifiable as a
“Democratic” one—did not raise as much money as Tumage’s clearly
130 Tumage interview.
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Republican constituency, it raised a competitive sum. As long as these two
interests are free to compete for seats on the court, they should balance one
another out.
Limits to campaign contributions and publication of the contributors’
lists help reduce the “influence” purchased through campaign contributions,
but they do not eliminate it. Trieweiler is probably right that no one is going to
jeopardize a career for a $750 contribution. That the justices vote in cases
generally in keeping with the interests which financed their elections should
surprise no one. Voters who did not know that Tumage and Trieweiler had
raised a lot of money, and who did not have a general idea of where it came
from, have only themselves to blame. This is not a perfect system, but
pubHcation of contributors’ lists and limits to contributions help make it
superior to the alternative.
Even taking into account the imperfections of the elective system
regarding influence, the elective method is clearly superior to the appointive
method, which is plagued with a different sort of influence problem. The
controversies over the current commission’s membership confirm the 1972
Constitutional Convention’s delegates’ worst fears. Their suspicions that
commissions were susceptible to control by factions are proven right by the
membership and operation of the current Judicial Nomination Commision.
The commission’s redesign in 1991 allowed it to become a political tool. The
votes detailed in the April 9, 1993, Lee newspaper story show that four of the
seven members on that commission voted for political favorites. One member
admitted in the newspaper story that “[t]he Stephens appointees are more
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inclined to pick some who tend to be more conservative people in the broad
sense of the

t e r m . ” is i

Since then, the supreme court replaced the two la w y e r

members of the commission in a procedure that was tainted by partisanship.
Trieweiler*s complaint that his voice was silenced in this appointment process
is well taken.
Possibly the current membership’s clearly political agenda is an
aberration. C.W. William Leaphart Jr., who served on the commission from
1978—six years after the commission’s creation by the Legislature following
the Constitutional Convention—until 1994, says the commission did not
appoint justices to fill any political agenda until the 1991 Legislature revised
the commission’s makeup. Leaphart said he believed one of the commission’s
prime tasks was to keep the governor’s cronies from achieving seats on the
supreme court, and he thought the commission prior to 1991 had accomplished
this

g o a l.

132 On the other hand, there was no particular reason for a rift to

develop between the commission and the govemor prior to 1991 because all
the governors were Democrats after the Constitutional Convention until Stan
Stephens was elected in 1988.
Leaphart predicts the commission’s membership will balance out again
in time. Nevertheless, its membership and conduct today—especially in the
light of the January 1994 appointments by the supreme court^strengthen

131 Charles S. Johnson, “Tally shows split on judicial commission,” The.
Billings Gazette, April 9, 1993, 3C. The comment came from James Mockler
of Helena, a Stephens appointee.
132 Leaphart interview.
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the argument that commissions are more susceptible to rigging than elections
are. This is politics, and interested groups will try to engineer the outcome.
Both methods are tainted, but it is harder to fix an election involving 400,000
voters than it is to fix a commission with seven members.
2. The Extent of the Policy-Making Role of Justices and Its Effect on How
Justices Should Be Chosen in a Democratic Society
The most persuasive reason that supreme court justices should be
elected rather than appointed is simply that they do make policy. The people
have every right to control the membership of the supreme court based on
that tenet alone. Certainly their policy-making role is limited, but even under
Gray’s or Tumage’s vision of the policy-making role of a justice—that it occurs
only rarely and is highly confined—the cases in which it does occur are
important to people.
More important, the justice’s “philosophy”— which Holmes insisted was
more “experience” than “logic”—has more effect on decisions than either Gray
or Tumage would allow. Supreme court justices affect the lives of people as
certainly as any legislator. They affect people intimately when they rule that
a stillborn baby is a person for purposes of seeking damages against a doctor.
They affect people importantly when they rule that the state improperly taxed
federal retirees and that it must refund those taxes no matter how adversely
the state’s budget may be affected by the refunds. In each of these examples,
justices decide out of a rational process more in keeping with Holmes’ views
than with Frankfurter’s. The life of the law, when the decision is to determine
legal “personhood” for a stillbirth, certainly must be experience and not logic,
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as Holmes suggested. Though logic plays a role in this as in any legal
argument, the determination in this case supports Holmes’ theory that “the
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy.. .even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men”
have a bigger role to play. The justices themselves as much as admitted this
when the majority opinion held that all subsequent questions of this nature will
need to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Justices ruling on these complex issues may feel frustrated by their
accountabihty to voters who have never read a supreme court opinion. But
voters do have a right to “hold their feet to the fire,” as Gray put it, even if “the
law”—meaning attention to precedent and judicial restraint—imposes
constraints on how the justice rules. In the end, all justices, equally
constrained by “the law,” disagree significantly about what the law says.
Voters are as capable of evaluating justices’ legal opinions as are the lay
members of a judicial nomination commission. They are entitled to do so by
the effects of judicial decisions. The justices should remedy the problem of the
ill-informed electorate by being more forthcoming during political campaigns
about decisions and reasoning. Their philosophies are an important part of
how they decide cases. Their voting records do reveal their philosophies. After
all, even under the Missouri Plan, the prototype for the appointive judiciary,
judges must run “against their records.”
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3.
The Relative Abilities of the Electorate
and Nominating Commissions to Select Good Justices
On its face, a judicial nominating commission like Montana’s, composed
of two lawyers, a judge and four lay members, ought to do a better job selecting
qualified people for the court than the electorate can. Leaphart said the
commission made it a regular practice to telephone attorneys around the state
to find out about candidates for judicial nomination. The lawyers on the
commission called other lawyers to find out if the nominees were competent
lawyers, were well thought of in the legal community, and were up to the
demands of the court’s case

l o a d . 133

This seems a far superior method of

finding good judges than relying on voters who may have only a vague idea of
what supreme court justices do.
The electorate does not systematically “select” good candidates to run
for the supreme court under the current system. Candidates self-select based
on factors which may not have anything to do with whether they will be good
judges. The main factor operating on this selection process is money. If
candidates cannot attract the money to support a statewide race, they should
not run. Gray is probably right that this criterion eliminates a lot of lawyers
who have not had media attention or who do not appeal to a specific moneyed
constituency, like plaintiffs attorneys or doctors.
Trieweiler’s answer to the weaknesses of the selection features of the
elective system is unconvincing. True, the elective process produced him. The
characteristics he possesses—his liberal philosophy, his open commumcation

133 Leaphart interview.
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style—are healthy for the court and unlikely to have won him appointment, at
least by the current commission. But his experience in the 1992 chief justice
race is not likely to inspire others to follow in his footsteps, as he suggested. He
him self admitted it was unpleasant. Perhaps his 1990 race against Greeley is
a better example of a race to inspire others to run. But the fact is that in 1994
two seats on the supreme court will be filled in uncontested races.
This raises another aspect of weakness in the elective process: 1994’s
uncontested elections may indicate that the elective process discourages
interest among lawyers in sitting on the court. In a typical judicial
appointment, at least 20 lawyers apply for the seat, yet in the 1994 supreme
court election two candidates will run unopposed. One of the candidates.
Nelson, is an incumbent only by virtue of his 1992 appointment, hardly
entitling him to a firm hold on the seat; the other is a newcomer to politics
running unopposed for an open seat. One of the former lawyer members of the
Judicial Nomination Commission argues that these uncontested races show a
major weakness in the elective system—it does not generate the interest that
the appointive system does.is-*
Trieweiler argued that the element of risk involved in an election to the
supreme court naturally reduces interest. “I have a feeling,” he said, “there
are a lot of qualified lawyers who have the attitude if someone hands me this
job, or if I can be appointed to it, Fd like to be a j u d g e . ” iS 5 Trieweiler made clear
134 Robert James, interview by author. Telephone interview, Billings,
Montana, April 1, 1994.
135

Trieweiler interview transcript, 9.
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that he felt this interest was inferior to the interest of a candidate willing to
subject him self to the rigors of a statewide campaign.
There is no easy answer to these weaknesses in the elective system, but
both John Schiltz and Terry Trieweiler, who ran for chief justice of the supreme
court and lost, offer persuasive defense of the elective system over the
appointive system. Schiltz said in the debate over judicial selection at the
Montana Constitutional Convention, “if I have to choose between one or the
other. I'm going to the electorate every time, because I had a chance to be
elected.... At least I had a c h a n c e . ” i3 6 Trieweiler echoed this sentiment
throughout his interview. Without contested elections, no one can take the risk
to unseat a justice and the result for the public is an impermissible loss of
voice.
Finally, two more persuasive complaints about the electorate’s ability
to select good justices are that voters are poorly informed and that they tend to
send the same judges back to office again and again— “like sheep,” as Jean
Bowman argued on the floor of Montana’s constitutional convention.

Gray

correctly identified the weakness in the second argument: it presupposes that
more justices should be thrown out.i^s in fact, justices do lose their seats
periodically and over issues that matter to the electorate. Justice Gene Daly
lost to L.C. Gulbrandson in 1982 after a campaign dominated by a “law and

136 Transcript, 1027.
137 Transcript, 1031.
138 Gray interview transcript, 4.
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order theme. The most celebrated example among believers in the election
system is Paul Hatfield’s 1976 victory over sitting justice Wesley Castles for
the chief justice s seat. Hatfield ran against Castles’ record, saying that the
court had fallen under the influence of the state’s major corporations. The
voters chose Hatfield even though Castles had served on the court since
1958.139

Justices and scholars agree that the electorate is not well informed
about courts, their role, or their personnel. Justices and scholars disagree over
how to improve voter information. Gray was uncomfortable with any kind of
campaign tactic that might increase the voters’ misunderstanding that a
supreme court justice is simileir to a representative. For instance, she balked
at the idea of any sort of “judicial report card” of the type that political action
committees produce for legislative candidates. The issues involved in casting a
judicial vote are much too complicated to be simplified on a “voter tally sheet,”
Gray said. Trieweiler, on the other hand, had no problem with tally sheets on
judicial votes. Trieweiler was confident that he could “explain [his] votes to at
least 51 percent of the voters’ satisfaction, if [he] had a c

h a n c e .

The main

139 Schiltz mentioned the Hatfield-Castles race in correspondence, but
the main source of information regarding the race was Trieweiler. Trieweiler
interview transcripts, 1. Hatfield was not the first candidate to challenge a
member of the 1960s supreme court on the issue of its alleged corporate
favoritism. Schiltz also tried the tactic. An October 6, 1970, Schiltz campaign
advertisement from The Billings Gazette reads, “In the last 5 years, 107 cases
involving persons injured through negligence have come before the Supreme
Court. In 72 of these cases, district judges or juries had found for the injured
person. My opponent voted to reverse the district judges or juries in 45 of these
cases—62 percent.” Schiltz’ opponent was James Harrison.
140 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
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thing missing from judicial campaigns is the opportunity for candidates to
explain votes without concern that they will violate the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Trieweiler suggested one method to improve voter information would be
televised candidate forums sponsored by the University of Montana Law
School. He said he and his opponent in the 1990 election, Mike Greeley,
participated in a number of such forums, never televised. The law school's
participation, with questions devised and asked by law professors, should
dispense with the difficulties presented by the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Candidates should not resist answering questions posed by informed legal
experts.
Despite its weaknesses in identifying and selecting good judicial
character, the elective process is superior to the appointive process in this
area. Leaphart said the current commission is more interested in justices’
political connections than in their suitability to the work of a supreme court
justice. The purpose of the judicial nominating commission—to find qualified
lawyers to serve as judges and to check a governor’s power to pack the
court—may not achieve its intended result with the current commission.
The electorate may not have any better record than the nominating
commission at producing the intended result, but all the justices interviewed
agreed that justices should face the electorate. Trieweiler believed the election
process actually improved any justice’s performance. Gray thought retention
elections were sufficient to provide accountability to the public. However,
giving voters only “accept or reject” options, without giving them someone to
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vote for, takes away the whole point of voting. A retention election would
become the thing critics fear elections to be now, the voters' rubber-stamp of a
judge they never chose in the first place.
4. Can Judicial Independence Be Secured in an Elective System?
The most difficult hurdle to surmount while arguing in favor of electing
judges involves judicial independence. Elections are won by majorities and
“tyranny of the majority” has been an identified evil since Madison’s time.
Elected judges have much to fear from unpopular decisions. Though Trieweiler
claims to have made more unpopular decisions than any other current
justicei4i and is convinced he could explain his decisions to voters,142 Gray’s
problem with elections is well taken. She says the court is not a political body.
It is a legal body. “And therein is the hugest chasm that anyone could
imagine,” she said.i43 Gray worries about the elements of the election process
that reinforce the impression among voters that the court is a political body.
For example, Gray said popular majorities may unseat a justice because of a
perceived deficiency on the court, such as the perception that the court is not
tough enough on criminals. The problem with this action reflects voters’
misunderstanding of the courts and their role. Gray said, “The remedy, if there
is sufficient popular support, is to go to the Legislature and get tougher laws.
141 He may be right. A December 31,1993 Billings Gazette article
points out that Trieweiler was the supreme court’s most frequent dissenter for
the third straight year. David Fenner, “Trieweiler had most high court
dissents,” The Billings Gazette, December 31, 1993, Cl.
142 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
143 Gray interview transcript, 3.
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That’s part of the chasm between responding to what may at a moment be the
popular will or the perceived will, and our job of following and of applying the
law. 144 Gray’s “chasm” and the financing of judical elections are the biggest
problems with electing judges. Judges must have the courage and
independence to make an unpopular decision.
The elective process does protect a different kind of judicial
independence, however. Terry Trieweiler may be right that no nominating
commission would have chosen him, although Leaphart says the pre-1991
nominating commission would have recommended Trieweiler. He is certainly
correct in his assertion that only the election process allows an aspiring judge
to “control [his] own destiny.” Trieweiler’s complaint that the appointive
process puts the aspiring justice’s fate into the hands of “a small clique of
politically appointed people” needs to be balanced against Gray’s concerns
about the fickle nature of democratic majorities. Judicial independence, if
viewed as complete independence from electoral majorities, will not be achieved
through the elective process. But a more critical kind of independence is lost
through the appointive process. Not only is the appointive process more
susceptible to control by powerful cliques, but it also takes away the freedom
of a candidate to throw his hat in the ring, to run the best campaign he can,
and to trust himself to the voters.
B.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Montana would benefit from electing all its supreme court justices, even
those who are filling mid-term vacancies. Some of the flaws in the elective
144/bid., 5.
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process—the risk assumed by challenging an incumbent, the difficulty of
rumung a statewide campaign without a support sytem, the problems raising
money—could be reduced by making the elections partisan.
Justice Gray argued persuasively against partisan judicial elections,
saying that party “labels” would feed the voter misconception that “we
represent if not individual voters’ views, party’s views.... I do think it would be
easier for voters because they are used to having those labels and translating
those labels into a certain package of personal views. ..but that isn’t what we’re
supposed to come here to do.”i4s The trend injudicial selection reform is to
move away from elections generally, and far away from partisan elections. In
fact, there are only 10 states that use partisan elections to select supreme
court justices, and one of those (Pennsylvania) is in the middle of a scandal
over its partisan election process that may well lead to an entirely appointive
system. Of those remaining, six are deep South states which may have
partisan elections as a holdover from their Democratic machine days.
Nevertheless, partisan elections are a more forthright way to conduct a
selection process that is in fact run on something like “party lines” anyway.
The practical result of the elections process is to divide candidates—and the
resources candidates rely on—into two readily identifiable camps. Identif^ng
the constituencies officially with party labels would only be calling a spade a
spade. Trieweiler’s point that bankers gave money to Tumage because
Tumage thinks like a banker is important, especially since not all the voters
might have known Tumage’s philosophy or background. In fact, Tumage s
145 Gray interview transcript, 13.
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case offers an excellent example of the way nonpartisan campaigns muddy the
waters of an election. Tumage’s ties to the Republican Party are longstanding.
He was the Republican leader in the Senate for many years before he came to
the supreme court. His judicial philosophy certainly reflects the same values
he held in the Senate. Why shouldn’t all the voters be given the benefit of his
party label when he runs for the supreme court? The voters would gain
because, as Gray noted, they are used to processing candidates using party
labels.
Party support would alleviate some of the problems experienced by
judicial candidates. They would not be faced with running a statewide
campaign with no support system. Some of their funding would come from the
party, lessening their reUance on lawyer contributions. Also, with the party
fronting the opposition csmdidate, incumbents would more likely face vigorous
opposition. This guess is home out in statistics from Montana’s partisan
judicial election days, when 52 percent of supreme court justices experienced
“meaningful opposition.”i46
A second recommendation is public financing of judicial campaigns. All
of the justices interviewed favored public financing in principle. They know
that this method is superior to relying on lawyers’ contributions. They know
that lawyers’ contributions do form the major part of supreme court “war
chests,” despite Tumage’s impressive fundraising in other quarters. However,
in hght of the fact that the state legislature only last year did away with this
provision, it is not a very realistic proposal.
146 Lopach, 157-
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Since neither of these two recommendations is likely to find a following,
these less disruptive amendments could be made to the current system:
1. To reduce the stress and expense of a statewide campaign, justices
could be elected on a regional basis, like members of the Public Service
Commission. This change could increase the perception that supreme court
justices “represent” specific interests, in this case regional ones; and it might
lessen the court's role as the Montana Supreme Court, the only court that
belongs to the whole state.
2. Televised debates between judicial candidates could be sponsored by
the University of Montana Law School. This is an essential reform to a
system that everyone agrees is deeply flawed by a poorly informed electorate.
More vigorous debate is essential to improving voters' understanding of the
court and its role, but the Canons of Judicial Ethics do place restraints on what
shape this debate can take. The present system affords a sanctuary for a
justice who does not want to talk about his record. Putting supreme court
debates in the hands of professionals at the law school is a good way to get
around this problem.
3. Lawyers might entertain the possibility of setting up an anonymous
campaign fund, rather than donating sums to individual candidates. While the
justices interviewed did not think this a bad idea exactly, they knew it was an
impractical one. Tumage identified a key weakness in this plan, that some
lawyers would not give money if they thought it would end up with a candidate
they did not approve of. Also, as Gray pointed out, such funding might increase
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the perception that lawyers have a greater interest in the supreme court than
ordinary citizens do.
4. The method of choosing members of the Judicial Nomination
Commission could be revamped to insulate it from one-sided partisan influence.
Equal representation by members of each party could be required on the
commission. Such a restriction now applies to other boards, including the
Board of Public Education. Since the Judicial Nomination Commission plays
an integral role in placing people on the state supreme court, its membership
should certainly be bi-partisan, much more certainly than boards with less
consequence. Appointments to the supreme court have an enormous effect on
pubhc policy and should reflect the participation of both parties, not just the
participation of the party in power at any given time.
5. The supreme court should establish a protocol that requires a
conference for choosing its members on the Judicial Nomination Commission.
Trieweiler complained publicly that the supreme court’s January 1994
appointments to the commission were made without sufficient involvement by
members of the court. Without a rule governing this selection process it is
possible through informal persuasion to control these critical appointments.
The whole court should discuss, then decide on, its appointments to the Judicial
Nomination Commission.
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